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Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to 
have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller's morals opens the door for trust, reward, exploitation and 
reputation building.  We report experiments suggesting that sellers' intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not 
sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the interaction of 
social preferences and cleverly designed reputation mechanisms that solves to a large extent the trust problem on 
Internet market platforms. However, economic theory and social preference models tend to underestimate the 
difficulties of promoting trust in anonymous online trading communities. 
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I.   Introduction: Trust on Internet market platforms 
In a traditional market place, trust plays little role in the exchange of a good of recognizable 
quality.  Being physically together in time and space allows buyers to inspect the item before 
buying, and permits a ‘simultaneous’ exchange of money and object.  The situation is quite 
different in computer-mediated online markets such as eBay’s auction house and Amazon’s 
market platform for used books.  Transactions on these platforms are characterized by 
asynchronous (sequential) actions of anonymous traders, operating at spatially disperse locations.  
In such a setting, trust becomes a critical issue.   
 
It is not just the scattering of trade in space and time that pose a challenge to Internet exchange, it 
is also the medium of communication per se.  Computer-mediated communication makes it more 
difficult to signal trustworthiness and to promote cooperation than ‘richer’ communication media 
such as face-to-face communication (Frank 1988, Brosig et al. 2003).  Trading via computer 
networks also allows buyers and sellers to freely choose a trader identity, different from one’s 
true ‘offline identity,’ that can be changed, often with ease.  In addition, lasting personal 
relationships on Internet market platforms are infrequent; unlike in traditional market 
environments, one-shot interaction is the rule rather than the exception (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 
2002).  Thus, cyberspace makes it particularly difficult to develop social and economic bonding 
that supports the emergence of trust and trustworthiness in more traditional markets.
1
 
To deal with the problem, many online market platforms implement electronic reputation 
mechanisms that collect, process, and distribute large amounts of information about past trading 
activities of the market participants.  These reputation mechanisms attempt to emulate traditional 
word-of-mouth networks and thus promote trust and trustworthiness among strangers.  On 
eBay’s “feedback forum”, for instance, market participants continuously assess and reassess their 
transaction partners.  Figure 1 provides a sample of the type of feedback that is left on the site.  
                                                 
(continued on next page) 
1 There are more difficulties.  For example, unlike in traditional auction markets, such as in Christie’s and Sotheby’s 
auction houses, transactions among private individuals conducted on online market platforms such as eBay and 
Amazon are typically not secured; that is, eBay and Amazon neither attest to the credibility of the private sellers nor 
do they guarantee item quality.  Also, selling on the Internet is typically cheap, so that signaling trustworthiness 
through ‘fancy store fronts’ is not possible (although fancy homepages or elaborately designed offers may well 
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Each user’s assessment is made public and so forms his individual reputation that others can 
condition their behavior on.  As eBay’s founder Pierre Omidyar writes in a letter to all users: 
 
By creating an open market that encourages honest dealings, I hope to make it easier to conduct 
business with strangers over the net.  Most people are honest. And they mean well. Some people go 
out of their way to make things right. I've heard great stories about the honesty of people here. But 
some people are dishonest. Or deceptive. […] It's a fact of life. But here, those people can't hide. We'll 
drive them away. Protect others from them. This grand hope depends on your active participation. 




Figure 1.  An example of buyer feedback at eBay (left for a seller of Chinese antiques) 
 
 
In this paper, we describe a simple experimental game that captures the key problems of trust 
and trustworthiness on Internet market platforms from an economics point of view.  We present 
new experiments and survey other evidence indicating why and when people do or do not trust.  
We also compare the empirical evidence with economic theories of decision making and 
                                                 
signal professional commitment and competence).  Finally, formal contracting and legal enforcement is more costly 
(at least relative to the item’s value) than in traditional markets. 
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institutional design.  The two critical findings from this work that we will emphasize are, first, 
that understanding trust and trustworthy behavior requires us to consider a mix of human 
motives, no one motive being sufficient, and second, that the expression of these motives is 
sensitive to the institutional and strategic environment.   The important implication is that trust 
and trustworthy behavior is neither wholly a matter of social norms and morality, as it is 
sometimes popularly assumed, nor entirely a matter of institutional design, as economists 
sometimes assume.  Understanding how trust and trustworthiness is, and can be, sustained in an 
environment like the Internet will require a coming to grips with the interplay between the two. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we motivate and describe the game.  In section 3, 
we analyze one-shot encounters of the game from the point of view of recent behavioral theories 
that seek to explain when trust and trustworthy behavior will arise.  In section 4, we focus on 
institutional explanations of how trust and trustworthiness can be created even if traders are 
ultimately guided by their material self-interest; these explanations all pivot on repeated 
encounters.  Section 5 summarizes the findings.  
 
II.  The trust dilemma  
Typically, in online trading, a seller posts an offer on the market platform that includes a 
description of the item and its condition, and a price at which he is willing to sell.  Then, a 
willing buyer sends the money to the seller.  Finally, upon receiving the money, the seller is 
supposed to ship the item to the buyer.
2   
 
With no outside control, having received the money, the seller can profit from not sending the 
item or sending poorer quality than promised.  Anticipating this moral hazard, buyers may not be 
willing to buy.  As a consequence, trading that would make everybody better off would not take 
place.  This is the essential trust dilemma that online markets need navigate.  The following 
game-tree captures this dilemma (for the moment, ignore the number in the brackets).   
                                                 
2 Here we assume that the seller fixes the price, such as on Amazon’s used book market.  However, all arguments in 
this paper hold equally if the price is endogenously determined, such as in eBay’s auctions (in this case the auction 
winner is the buyer). 
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 Buyer  earns  50  0  35   
 Seller  earns  50  70  35   
 
 
Both the seller and the buyer are endowed with 35, which is the payoff when no trade takes 
place.  The seller offers an item for sale at a price of 35 which has a value of 50 to the buyer.  
The seller’s cost of providing the buyer with the item − costs associated with executing the trade, 
shipping, handling, as well as production costs − is 20.  So each successfully completed trade 
creates a consumer surplus of 15 and a net profit of 15 for the seller.  If the buyer chooses to buy 
the item, he sends 35 to the seller, who then has to decide whether to ship the item.  If the seller 
does not ship, he receives the price plus his endowment of 35 for a total of 70.  If he ships, he 
receives the price minus the costs plus his endowment for a total of 50.  If the buyer chooses not 
to buy the item, no trade occurs.   
 
The game captures the critical features of online trade.  First, traders move sequentially because 
they are dispersed in space and time.  Second, the seller’s pecuniary motive dictates to keep the 
money along with his endowment and to not ship the item.  In this case, the buyer would lose his 
endowment and end up with nothing.  If the buyer anticipates that the seller does not ship, he will 
not buy and thus no transaction will take place.  This is the prediction of economic theory 
assuming that traders are only guided by pecuniary concerns.  Third, interaction is anonymous.  
In particular, the name attached to the seller does not reveal information about his 
trustworthiness.
3  Fourth, the trust-game is one-shot, meaning that there is no common history or 
common future among traders that could give them the opportunity to reward or punish each 
                                                 
3 Trustworthiness is no issue for known reputable sellers such as barnesandnoble.com.  But we will concentrate here 
on trading among anonymous individuals on market platforms with large numbers of buyers and sellers.   
  4 
other for past behavior or to develop other kinds of social or economic bonding with each other.  
(As we will see later, however, even one-shot interactions can be strategically linked via 
information flows.)  And fifth, since legal enforcement is typically too expensive to be a credible 
threat, prosecution when the item is not shipped is not an option in the game.
4  In the next 
sections, we discuss experimental evidence using the basic trust game as a vehicle for studying 
trust and trustworthiness.   
 
III.   Trust in one-shot games: Behavioral explanations  
III.1 The nature of trust 
(a) Distributional aspects 
From the point of view of economic analysis, one can hardly think about a more trust-unfriendly 
environment than online market platforms; yet, many of these platforms flourish.  So what makes 
these platforms work?  One possible answer is that our basic trust game does accurately describe 
the market institution but that people behave in a different way than the economic analysis 
suggests.  In particular, it is sometimes argued that people are not as selfish as economists 
typically assume, and that traders care about morals.  In fact, in trust games and related 
anonymous one-shot games (like the prisoner’s dilemma game and the ultimatum game), 
psychologists, sociologists, experimental economists and others have identified a couple of non-
pecuniary motives that may drive behavior.  Most prominently and actively discussed in the 
recent economics literature are concerns for fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000) and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, forthcoming).   
Some authors also put forward an individual concern for efficiency (Charness and Rabin, 2002).   
 
All these social preference models assume that traders care about their own monetary payoff but 
that some traders may additionally be concerned with the social impact of their behavior.   
Reciprocity models conjecture that people tend to be kind in response to kindness and unkind in 
response to unkindness, while fairness models posit that some individuals may have a preference 
                                                 
(continued on next page) 
4 The game abstracts away a couple of features that may be relevant to online markets.  For instance, we assume that 
there is no uncertainty about the item’s quality (and so there is no reason to have a first game stage in which the 
seller describes the item’s condition).  However, the seller’s strategy ‘not ship’ can easily be reinterpreted as ‘lying 
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for equitably sharing the efficiency gains from trade.  That is, in our trust game, reciprocity 
models suggest that a seller ships because the buyer was so kind to buy, whereas fairness models 
suggest that he ships because otherwise the payoff distribution would be unfair.  Models of 
efficiency striving behavior, finally, suggest that traders care about the sum of payoffs.  That is, a 
seller in our trust game may ship because this increases the pie to be distributed – independent of 
reciprocal and distributive fairness.   
 
One important implication of all these models is that it is not the buyers’ social concerns that 
drive the trading activities but the sellers’ social motives.  As long as the sellers are strictly 
selfish and rational, there will be no shipping and thus no buying by rational buyers.  Even a 
perfectly fair-minded buyer, always striving for equitable outcomes, would prefer 35 for both 
players over 70 for the seller and zero for himself (this holds, e.g., regardless of whether we 
apply Fehr and Schmidt’s or Bolton and Ockenfels’ model here).  Similarly, in reciprocity 
models, a buyer is only willing to buy if the seller reciprocates by shipping (again, this holds 
regardless of the specific reciprocity model).  Finally, a buyer concerned about efficiency cannot 
increase efficiency by sending money to a seller who is unwilling to materialize the efficiency 
gain by completing the trade.  Thus, the only plausible reason to buy in our basic trust game is 
that the buyer sufficiently strongly believes that the seller will ship.  By this view, the 
preferences of the buyer are largely irrelevant: shipping in our basic trust game induces a selfish, 
a reciprocal, a fair-minded or an efficiency striving buyer to trust.   
 
At first glance, the statement that trust is the belief that the seller ships (with a sufficiently high 
probability) may sound like a trivial statement, but in fact it is highly sensitive to the details of 
the trust game.  To see why, let us consider a very simplified 2-trader version of “ERC”, the 
fairness model developed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).  In this model, each trader i  is 
motivated by his pecuniary income yi (equivalent to the payoffs given at the end nodes of the 
trust game tree) but also prefers fair over unfair final payoff distributions.  A payoff distribution 
is perceived as unfair if a trader either earns more or less than the trading partner, that is, in the 
                                                 
about the item’s true quality’.  Also, in principle one can easily introduce legal enforcement and courts (see, e.g., 
Güth and Ockenfels, forthcoming, for an example), for, say, high-stake transactions. 
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simplest form, if (yi – yj)
2 > 0.
5  Traders motivated this way can be characterized by a ‘motivation 
function’ or utility ui: 
 
ui(yi, yj) = yi – ri(yi – yj)
2
 
Utility is increasing in pecuniary income but decreasing in the inequality of income distribution.  
Not all traders suffer equally from unfairness; the parameter ri ≥ 0 measures the trade-off of 
trader i between the (sometimes) competing motives.  Setting ri = 0 yields the standard economic 
model of complete selfishness.  The distribution of ri in the population is supposed to follow 
some cumulative distribution function F(ri).  
 
In our basic trust game, a buyer i will only trust if his expected payoff from trusting, p(50 – 0ri) 
+ (1 – p)(0 – ri(– 70)
2), is larger than his certain payoff from not trusting, 35, where p is the 
probability that a trusted seller will ship.
6  Equivalently, the condition for trust is:  
 
ri < (50p – 35)/(4900(1 – p)). 
 
That is, buyer i is only willing to buy if shipping is likely (p is large) and if he is sufficiently 
selfish, that is, if ri is sufficiently small.  Why?  The buyer can avoid being exploited by the seller 
by not buying the item.  Thus, if fairness (or exploitation aversion) is the main motive, he should 
not buy.  He will only run the risk of being exploited and buy the item when the expected 
material gain of trade is sufficiently large, and if he is sufficiently motivated by the material gain 
relative to his inequity aversion.  In other words, in our basic trust game, pecuniary motives drive 
trust.  Buying is motivated by trust in shipping, not by non-pecuniary incentives.   
 
While the simple model we present here oversimplifies certain complexities (and the general 
ERC model addresses some of these complexities), it sharply explains why the act of buying can 
                                                 
5 The general ERC model assumes that a trader may care about his own relative standing in a reference group, but 
the model formulation we use here works equally well in this particular 2-traders setting.  Also, the general ERC 
model does not restrict the functional form of inequality aversion in any way.  In particular, it is not restricted to be 
linear, nor quadratic, nor symmetric around equality. 
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be identified as trust in our basic trust game and is not confounded by other motives.  By the 
same token, what has been called trust in other standard trust games studied in the literature may 
have little to do with trust in a reciprocal response.  In sequential prisoner’s dilemma games or in 
the well-known investment game by Berg et al. (1995) cooperating, respectively investing, 
increases efficiency, so that trusting may theoretically reflect a concern for efficiency.  The 
following example demonstrates the difficulties of identifying trust when the basic game is even 
only slightly changed: 
 










 Buyer  earns  120  70  105   
 Seller  earns  50  70  35   
 
 
The asymmetric trust game in Figure 3 is the same game as our basic trust game in Figure 2 with 
the exception that the buyer gets an additional payment of 70 regardless of the game outcome.  
While this small change has no effect on the standard economic analysis based on (marginal) 
pecuniary incentives, it may have a big effect on behavior in a world with fairness.  Assume that 
some traders care about equitable outcomes as described in the model above.  This model 
predicts that no seller in the asymmetric trust game, regardless of his rj, will ever ship, because 
not shipping maximizes pecuniary outcomes and is equitable.
7  That is, this model predicts that 
there is no shipping, regardless of the extent to which the seller population is selfish or fair.  The 
interesting point is that even if he anticipates that there is no shipping, a fair-minded buyer may 
still want to buy.  By buying he sacrifices pecuniary payoff in exchange for a fair distribution.
8  
In particular, a buyer i prefers to buy if  
 
                                                 
6 A seller j will ship if 50 > 70 – rj(70)
2, or equivalently rj > .004; thus, p = 1 – F(.004).   
7 Shipping yields for the seller 50 – rj(50 – 120)
2; not shipping yields 70 which is greater for all rj ≥ 0. 
8 These effects have also been studied in the so called dictator game (see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1991). 
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70 > 105 – ri(70)
2, or equivalently if ri > .011. 
 
However, this buying cannot be interpreted as trust in shipping: no seller will ship and all buyers 
know that.  Buying, in the asymmetric trust game of Figure 3, might, however, be motivated by 
fairness.  Confounding motives for trust like this are largely avoided in the basic trust game. 
 
(b) Procedural aspects 
Trust necessarily involves the risk of being exploited.  An interesting question is whether the risk 
of a bad outcome is treated differently when it is due to uncertainty of the seller’s morals or 
whether it is just determined by a chance move (e.g., there is always a risk that the item is 
accidentally lost or damaged in the mail).  Standard economic theory does not distinguish 
between different sources of risk when the probabilities for the different states of the world are 
equivalent.  Bohnet and Zeckhauser (forthcoming) demonstrate in an experiment, however, that 
the risk is perceived differently in a social context than in a non-social context, something that is 
not captured by any of the social preference models mentioned so far.  The game they study is 
similar to our basic trust game, but the shipping decision is made, not by a seller, but a chance 
move.  The following figure illustrates their game within our simple framework: 
 






Nature  not buy 
probability α probability  1  –  α 
Buyer 
 Buyer  earns  50  0  35   
 Seller  earns  50  70  35   
 
In their study, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (forthcoming) asked each buyer for the probability α such 
that he is indifferent between buying and not buying.  They also asked each buyer in the basic 
trust game (where the sellers determine the shipping probability α  endogenously) which 
probability of being matched with a trustworthy seller makes him indifferent between buying and 
not buying.  By using an incentive-compatible experimental design, Bohnet and Zeckhauser 
  9 
could compare how much risk buyers are willing to take if the source of the risk is the morals of 
the sellers, as in the basic trust game, to the amount of risk they are willing to take in a lottery, as 
in the random-shipping game.  In fact, Bohnet and Zeckhauser find that “individuals are much 
more willing to take risks when the outcome is due to chance, as opposed to an equivalent-odds 
situation where the outcome depends on whether another player proves trustworthy. Taking a 
chance on the latter risks incurring betrayal costs, costs shown to be above and beyond mere 
monetary losses.”   
 
A related effect has been observed by Blount (1995) in the context of bargaining games.  The 
same offer was more acceptable to a responder when determined by a lottery than when 
determined by a (human) proposer.  A plausible interpretation for these effects is based on a 
notion of procedural fairness that has been first put forward and tested by Bolton, Brandts and 
Ockenfels (2003).  The idea is that an unfair outcome chosen by a fair lottery is more acceptable 
than the same unfair outcome chosen by another trader.  This notion of procedural fairness is not 
only consistent with Blount’s bargaining experiment but also with Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s trust 
game study.  It is, however, inconsistent with both standard economic models and social 
preference models in behavioral economics that are all invariant to the fairness of procedures 
(see, however, Bolton et al., 2003, for a sketch of a model that extends the social utility approach 
to procedures).   
 
 
III.2 The nature of trustworthiness 
(a) Distributional aspects 
Trust in shipping drives buying.  But what drives shipping?  As mentioned before, all social 
motives described so far – fairness, reciprocity and efficiency – may trigger shipping.  Here we 
examine some empirical evidence on this issue.   
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Let’s look first at the basic and the asymmetric trust game in Figures 1 and 2.  Buying can, for 
both games, be equally interpreted as ‘kind’ behavior and thus, since the seller payoffs are 
unchanged, reciprocity models would predict no difference of shipping probabilities across the 
two games.
9  Furthermore, observe that efficiency-seeking behavior would also make no 
distinction, because an additional endowment to the buyer in the asymmetric trust game does not 
affect the amount of potential efficiency gains across outcomes.  As explained before, however, 
fairness models predict that while some sellers may be willing to ship in the basic game, nobody 
is willing to ship in the asymmetric game.  Thus, while reciprocity and efficiency models predict 
no change in seller behavior, fairness models predict less shipping in the asymmetric trust game. 
 
We studied these games in classroom experiments.
10  While in the basic trust game 37 percent of 
the 30 sellers were willing to ship, in the asymmetric trust game only 7 percent shipped (see the 
numbers in the brackets in Figures 1 and 2).  Thus, the data highly significantly (p < .01) reject 
reciprocity and efficiency as the predominant explanation of trustworthiness; fairness, on the 
other hand, is largely confirmed (though the two sellers who ship are inconsistent with the 
fairness motive but consistent with both other motives considered here).   
 
Interestingly, even though far fewer sellers are willing to ship in the asymmetric game, 
significantly more buyers are willing to buy (27% in the basic trust game and 46% in the 
asymmetric trust game; p < .05).  This suggests that fairness, and not trust in shipping, is the 
main driver for buying in the asymmetric trust game.  Similar conclusions about the impact of 
distributive fairness preferences in trust and related games are drawn by a number of other 
experimental studies.
11   
                                                 
9 See, for example, Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming).  Since the intuition is quite plausible, we will make no 
attempt here to go more into the details of the reciprocity models’ mechanics, which can be quite complex. 
10 In this and the other one-shot experiments, we have thirty independent observations, respectively, for each choice 
separately (buying and shipping).  Each subject played only one of the studied games in only one role (buyer or 
seller).  For sellers we applied the strategy method, that is each seller was asked whether he would ship if the buyer 
chose to buy.  Half of all encounters were randomly chosen to be paid out according to the rules of the game.  A 
payoff of ten in the game tree translated to 1 Euro cash. 
11 See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000 and forthcoming) and the references cited therein.  More recently, a couple of 
authors also found evidence for efficiency-seeking behavior in simple, non-strategic payoff allocation games – 
games that however cannot easily be related to trust problems (Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 
forthcoming; see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2003, for a discussion of some of these results). 
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(b) Procedural aspect 
To what extent do sellers condition their behavior on the history of play?  The following game is 
the same as the basic trust game with the exception that the buying decision is made by a random 
procedure rather than by the buyer himself.  From the view of distributional fairness and standard 
economic models, nothing has changed for the seller, who still has exactly the same options over 
payoff distributions.  From the view of reciprocity models, however, since the buyer has no 
choice, buying cannot be attributed to the kindness of the buyer, and thus sellers have no reason 
to be ‘kind in response’.   
 











 Buyer  earns  50  0  35   
 Seller  earns  50  70  35   
 
In a classroom experiment study of the random-buying game, the shipping probability was with 
33% only slightly (and not statistically significantly) smaller than in the basic trust game (Figure 
5).  This indicates that distributional concerns play a major role while the history of play, that is 
‘intentionality’ and lottery procedures, only seem to play a minor role in determining 
trustworthiness. 
 
This result too is in line with a number of earlier studies.  In particular, the first experimental 
economics study of distributional versus reciprocity-based preferences in Bolton, Brandts and 
Ockenfels (1998) suggested, in the context of a sequential two-players cooperation game similar 
in the incentive structure as the one we study here, that the second mover’s behavior too was 
invariant to the history of play and to the ‘intentions’ of the first mover.  A number of subsequent 
studies (e.g., Brandts and Charness, forthcoming, and Güth et al., 2001) confirmed this 
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invariance property of behavior.  Charness and Rabin (2002) distinguish negative reciprocity 
games, games where other-regarding behavior has a punishment flavor to it (such as ultimatum 
and other bargaining games), from positive reciprocity games, games where other-regarding 
behavior has a reward flavor to it (such as dictator and trust games).  Attribution-based behavior 
was found to be significant only in negative reciprocity games (also see Bolton et al., 1998, and 
Offerman, 2002).  Some studies conclude that the response to fair or unfair behavior is 
substantially invariant (Blount, 1995; Dufwenberg et al., 2001) or only weakly sensitive 
(Charness, forthcoming) to whether the action is taken by a disinterested third party or by the 
actual game partner.  Overall, it seems fair to conclude from the behavioral economics literature 
that, at least for the kind of trust games that we are considering here (positive reciprocity games), 
distributional fairness is a major motive in virtually all studies, while reciprocity and 
intentionality are sometimes found to be a secondary concern.
12   
 
Summing up, our basic trust game is an appropriate vehicle to study the motives underlying trust 
and trustworthiness among online traders.  There is no trust without trustworthiness.   
Trustworthiness appears to be mainly driven by distributive fairness concerns.  Risk, a key 
ingredient of trust, is treated differently according to the procedure by which the uncertainty is 
resolved.  On the other hand, trustworthiness appears to be largely invariant to the history of play 
(e.g., intentions and lottery procedures). 
 
 
IV.  Trust in repeated games: Combining behavioral with institutional explanations 
In expected monetary terms, the probability of a trustworthy seller needs to be at least 70% in 
order to make buying in the basic trust game profitable.  In none of our one-shot games, was the 
                                                 
(continued on next page) 
12 We note that the fact that the implementation of a lottery affects behavior in the random-shipping game but not in 
the random-buying game is in line with Bolton et al.’s (2004) concept of procedural fairness.  In the random-
shipping game, an unfair outcome chosen by a fair lottery may be perceived as procedural fair; however, in the 
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shipping probability substantially greater than half the required amount.  Thus, if trust rests 
solely on behavioral propensities, such as social preferences, there is little hope that trust among 
strangers can be stable.
13  However, when we embed the trust game in a repeated setting, the 
interaction of social behavior with institutional design such as reputation mechanisms can 
multiply the impact of the ‘truly intrinsic’ trustworthiness, because cleverly designed institutions 
can create strategic incentives to be trustworthy even for selfish and rational sellers.  In this 
section we discuss these incentives, relate them to online market platforms and study their 
empirical content. 
 
Suppose, for the moment, that the same seller and the same buyer play the basic trust game 
repeatedly, with an infinite time horizon, and so have no expectation of a stopping round of play.  
In such a setting, even if all traders are completely selfish and rational, there exist equilibria in 
which the buyer always buys and the seller always ships.  The equilibria can be supported by 
trigger-strategies that call for a buyer, for instance, to trust as long as the seller ships.  If the 
seller defects only once, he will never be trusted again.  If future payoffs are sufficiently 
important, this gives an incentive to the seller to be trustworthy all the time, and thus for the 
buyer to trust all the time (ex., Kandori, 1992). 
 
There are, however, two problems with this kind of simple equilibria in our context.  First, the 
trading horizon in online market platforms is typically finite.  If either the buyer or the seller 
believes that there will be some upper boundary of items to be traded, cooperation among 
completely selfish, rational traders will unravel.  Second, buying and shipping in infinite game 
equilibria do not capture trust and trustworthiness because, in equilibrium, there is no uncertainty 
about each others’ behavior; in equilibrium, sellers can have a material incentive to ship, so there 
is no risk of being exploited.
14  Since this paper is concerned with trust (characterized by a risk of 
being exploited) in online markets (where traders trade a finite number of items), we prefer to 
                                                 
random-buying game an unfair outcome chosen by the seller cannot be justified as procedural fair within their 
model. 
13 While, of course,  payoffs, framing and context are different on computer mediated market platforms compared to 
our simple classroom game, we believe that an analogous conclusion also holds for actual online market platforms.   
14 There are also more subtle equilibria in which cooperation in any given round is uncertain, but, in our view, trust 
is also not satisfactorily described as an equilibrium selection problem. 
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study finitely repeated games.  In finite games, however, trust may only emerge when there is 
some (possibly small) amount of ‘truly intrinsic’ trustworthiness within the seller population 
(Wilson, 1985).
15  That there is intrinsic trustworthiness has been demonstrated in our 
experimental studies of the one-shot trust game.  
 
IV.1 Strangers market 
Suppose the market transactions take place over a series of rounds.  At the beginning of each 
round, a potential buyer is matched with a potential seller and they then play the basic trust game 
in Figure 2.  In the simplest version of such a repeated setting, each game is played with a 
different transaction partner
16 and no information about trade outcomes leaks from one encounter 
to another one.  This market is basically a sequence of one-shot games.  Thus, because there is 
not sufficient intrinsic trustworthiness to make trust profitable, we hypothesize that all trading 
activities will collapse. 
 










 Buyer  earns  50  0  35   
 Seller  earns  50  70  35   
 
 
In an experiment by Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (forthcoming), we had subjects play in 
precisely this format, over 30 rounds.  No buyer met the same seller more than once, so we call 
this experimental treatment the Strangers market.  All interaction was computer-mediated and 
anonymous; subjects sat in cubicles in front of computers not knowing the true identity of their 
                                                 
15 If not, all trust and trustworthiness would unravel.  We will not make an attempt to show the details of the 
equilibrium analysis of trust and trustworthiness in finitely repeated games in a world with fairness.  The mechanics 
of these equilibria are relatively complex (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2004, for a theoretical and experimental 
treatment within a trust game environment).  However, we note here that these equilibria in fact capture the risk of 
being exploited. 
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trading partners, capturing an important aspect of online trading.  The rules and that all rounds 
were actually paid was common knowledge.   Figure 6 shows the average buying and shipping 
(conditioned on buying) behavior over all rounds.   
 
There is almost the same amount of trustworthiness as in the one-shot version of the trust game 
in Figure 2.  This reflects that the Strangers market does not create additional incentives to be 
trustworthy as compared to the one-shot game.  On the buyer side, there is, on average, more 
trust in the Strangers market than in the one shot version of the game, possibly reflecting the 
hope that repeated action may support more cooperation.  But the dynamics reveal that buyers 
respond to the fact that, on average, this expectation was disappointed:  They started out by 
trusting quite a lot but trust quickly collapsed.  In fact, the percentage of last round trust was only 
0.04%, much less than in the one shot-game, indicating that buying in the one shot game is 
mainly due to inexperience.   
 
IV.2 Reputation market 
From an economic theory perspective, reputation mechanisms of the sort we describe in the 
introduction can solve many of the trust problems associated with the Internet.  In fact, simple 
theory suggests that information is the key prerequisite to the emergence of trust, because it 
allows buyers to avoid sellers who are known as fraudulent and to buy only from sellers who 
have been proven to be trustworthy in the past.  Conditioning trust on the seller’s history creates 
incentives for sellers to build up a reputation for being trustworthy, at least when the end of the 
market is not too close and maintaining a good reputation is still valuable.  A reputation of being 
trustworthy can be developed and sustained even by completely rational and selfish sellers – as 
long as the probability of being matched with intrinsically trustworthy sellers is strictly positive.  
That intrinsic trustworthiness exists is demonstrated in our one-shot classroom experiment and in 
many other experiments.  That it is not enough to sustain a trading platform that has no 
reputation system, however, is demonstrated in our experimental Strangers market.  So does a 
feedback system help promoting trust and trustworthiness as suggested by theory? 
                                                 
16 In fact, empirical evidence suggests that buyers and sellers on Internet market platforms such as eBay only 
occasionally come back to the same trading partner (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002).   
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In Bolton et al. (forthcoming) the Strangers market was compared to a Reputation market, played 
over 30 rounds, in which, as before, a buyer never met the same seller more than once.   
However, in this market we introduced a reputation system that, similar to eBay’s feedback 
forum, informs buyers about all past actions of their current seller (see Duffy and Ochs, 2003, 
and Bohnet and Huck, forthcoming, for related experimental work).  Outside the lab, there are a 
couple of problems with feedback systems having to do with the voluntary provision and 
strategic manipulation of feedback, and manipulation of online identities etc. (see Dellarocas, 
forthcoming, Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels, 2003, and Ockenfels, 2003).  In our experiments, 
however, feedback on the seller’s past behavior is always shared and reliable (because it is not 
given by the buyers themselves but by the experimenter), and sellers had no way to change their 
online identity.  This way, the experiment studies the impact of feedback information on trading 
behavior when an ideal, frictionless reputation mechanism is available. 
 











 Buyer  earns  50  0  35   
 Seller  earns  50  70  35   
 
 
On average, there is economically and statistically significantly more buying (56 vs. 37 percent; 
p < .05) and shipping (73 vs. 39 percent; p < .01) in the Reputation market than in the Strangers 
market.  In fact, the shipping probability is slightly higher than the threshold of 70% for trust 
being profitable.  As a consequence, the trade dynamics too look quite different than in the 
Strangers market; trading starts at about the same level as in the Strangers market but then the 
level remains stable until the very last rounds, when the strategic value of having a reputation for 
being trustworthy vanishes and virtually all cooperation collapses.  We conclude that introducing 
a feedback system in a market with strangers has a strongly positive impact on trust, 
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trustworthiness and trading efficiency.  Both buyers and sellers respond strategically to the 
information provided. 
 
IV.3 Partners market 
The positive impact of electronic reputation mechanisms relative to a Strangers market has also 
been demonstrated in various field studies (see, e.g., Dellarocas, forthcoming, for a recent 
survey).  However, field studies cannot measure trust and trustworthiness on Internet markets 
relative to offline markets that are typically characterized by repeated interaction between the 
same trading partners.   
 
Theoretically, offline partners-relationships should not do better than online markets that 
implement reputation mechanisms that reliably share all relevant information about the sellers’ 
past behavior.  That is, from a theoretical perspective matching is irrelevant for trust to emerge as 
long as buyers are sufficiently informed – either through their own experience or through the 
experience of third parties.  For the seller to have an incentive to be trustworthy, he need only 
expect that a future buyer will punish or reward his behavior; whether these punishments or 
rewards come from the same or from different buyers is irrelevant.  The buyer, to induce this 
trustworthiness, need only be equipped with sufficient information about the sellers’ histories; 
whether this information comes from one’s own experience or from different sources is 
irrelevant.  This is the basic message that derives from the game theoretic models: it is the 
information, not its source or its dissemination, that matters (ex., Kreps et al., 1982, Ellison, 
1994, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2004). 
 










 Buyer  earns  50  0  35   




So, does the flow of reputation information make no difference?  We tested this by comparing 
the Reputation market to a Partners market where the same two traders were matched over all 30 
rounds, keeping everything constant including the anonymity of trading partners, communication 
channels, etc.   
 
Our experiment demonstrates that the simple theory is quite misleading when it comes to the 
impact of matching and information flows (Figure 8).  There is substantially and statistically 
significantly more buying (83 vs. 56 percent) and shipping (87 vs. 73 percent) in the Partners 
market than in the Reputation market.  Thus, even an ideal reputation mechanism cannot 
substitute for a partners-relationship.
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V. Conclusions 
Normative economic theory, assuming that rationality and selfishness are common knowledge, 
does not capture trust in our basic game, because there is either never trustworthiness (in a one-
shot or finitely repeated version of the trust game) or there is no risk in ‘trusting’ (in simple 
equilibria of the infinitely repeated game).  This all changes when traders are allowed to have 
social preferences.  Then, uncertainty about one’s seller morals opens the door for trust, reward, 
exploitation and reputation building – even in the one-shot basic trust game, but especially in the 
(finitely) repeated game.   
 
In our experiments, sellers’ intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain 
trade when not complemented by a feedback system.  Translated to Internet market platforms, it 
seems likely that eBay or Amazon’s market for used books would quickly collapse without a 
reputation system.  On the other hand, a reputation system without any individual social concerns 
cannot work either.  If no seller would ever ship in a one-shot encounter, and if this were 
common knowledge among buyers, any cooperation would unravel, because the promise of 
being trustworthy will always be broken.  However, clever institutional design multiplies the 
positive impact of ‘truly intrinsic’ trustworthiness that exists even without such systems.  It is the 
                                                 
17 As we explain in Bolton et al. (forthcoming), this is because a feedback mechanism exhibits a kind of public 
goods problem in that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust and trustworthy behavior go to the whole 
community and are not completely internalized.    
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interaction of social preferences and reputation mechanisms that solves to a large extent the trust 
problem on Internet market platforms.  The strategic aspects of this interaction is in important 
parts captured by modern behavioral economics. 
 
At the same time, equilibrium theory and social preference models tend to underestimate the 
difficulties of promoting trust in anonymous online trading communities.  For one, in one-shot 
games, economic theory does not capture the observation that the source of risk, independent of 
its stochastic properties, affects behavior.  In terms of our basic trust game, the procedure by 
which the uncertainty of whether the item is shipped or not is resolved is critical for the buyers’ 
decision to trust – even if the objective risk parameters are the same.  The risk of being exploited 
by an untrustworthy seller makes buyers more cautious than (the same) risk that the item is 
accidentally lost by the postman.  As a consequence, the trust problem is more severe than 
models of rational risk behavior would suggest. 
 
Similarly, in repeated games, the role of information as provided by electronic reputation 
mechanisms is overrated by theory and the role of matching underrated.  Information problems 
can theoretically be solved by appropriate information dissemination, but, in fact, the matching 
scheme limits what can be maximally reached in anonymous online trade communities.   
Economic theory does not capture the observation that the source of information, independent of 
its content, affects behavior.  As a consequence, trust problems are more severe than models of 
rational processing of information would suggest. 
 
We think these results suggest that a satisfactory explanation of trust and trustworthiness in 
Internet markets will require a model that grapples with both the mixed motives of the traders 
and how these motives inter-play with the institutional design of the market.  In our experimental 
markets, trading behavior – trust and trustworthy behavior included – is clearly strategic but 
nevertheless differs in important ways from existing strategic models.  By the same token, any 
model that assumes that trust and trustworthy behavior is entirely a matter of social norms or 
morality will probably be unable to capture the important behavioral response traders have to 
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